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
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
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METAPHORS: FRAMEWORK AND PARAPHRASES

Viviane Lucy Vilar de Andrade[1]

Introduction

The present article aims to show the previous analyzes of an ongoing research which is going to be taken as the bases for a Ph. D. Dissertation.

In a research paper: Metaphors and Proposition (Bolsa PQ. 2010-2013), Moura proposes some issues related to the propositional content expressed by the metaphor in order to see if we can paraphrase the metaphor, so that the metaphorical sentence may be replaced by another which expresses the same proposition. He points out the relevance of this study backing its work in the various authors who currently also point out the cognitive value of metaphor. Faced with the impasse between metaphor X proposition, this research proposal follows the first line of inquiry appointed by Moura and takes as its theoretical framework (BLACK, 1993), analyzing the two components of the metaphorical statements: saying and showing: 2 Elements: SAY and SHOW

Metaphorical utterance   → SAY (propositional content of the metaphor - cognitive function)
                              → SHOW (conceptual handling that a metaphor holds, the metaphor shows us one thing as another)

This research is also based on (Pinker, 2008) to try to solve the following problem: do these conceptual connections are the typical element of metaphor and they can not be paraphrased (Moura), because we frame a situation differently and mutually incompatible? (Cf. Pinker, 2008, p.17). In fact, Pinker argues that the speaker chooses where he will concentrate when describing a scene, for example, he decides what he will focus on and what he will ignore. Pinker talks about the human capacity to frame a fact so self-exculpatory. Thus, by using a metaphor to say and show, the speaker thought of a "particular image" and there is no way to paraphrase the propositional content of the metaphorical statement.

 For Moura (2007, p. 418), the interpretation of a metaphor is guided by the context, which sets a standard of interpretation. H e also says that even for the more creative metaphors, there is agreement in the interpretation, which makes the speakers make very efficient use of metaphor. In Moura's research, it is proposed that the analysis of transitive verbs in the position of vehicles of metaphors about emotions and the *corpus* of the research examines examples taken from the web.

As a complement to his work, this project aims to examine real examples taken from depositions published in women's magazines of national circulation. I explain the reason for selecting these sources for the corpus of this research: once these are real examples of everyday life and these statements are imbued with emotion, the language employed is loaded with these metaphors investigated by Moura in his unprecedented research already shown previously, because, somehow, the "emotion and feeling become the protagonists of these discourses.

 In the article: Paradigmatic and Syntagmatic Relations in the Interpretation of Metaphors, Moura incorporates all four types of convention for interpretation in studies of metaphor: the Convention of using (Grice 1989, Searle, 1993), the Convention of conceptual representation (Lakoff, Johnson, 1980), the Convention of connotation (BLACK, 1962, 1993; Kittay, 1987; Glucksberg, 2001) and the Convention of denotation (Gentner, 1983; Bowdler, Gentner, 2005).

A preliminary analysis of the corpus of this work indicates that, in accordance with the convention of using (Grice 1989, Searle, 1993), the meaning of metaphor corresponds to a sense of the speaker. That is, making sense of a metaphor is to recover the sense that the

speaker wanted to give to this non-literal use. Thus, the metaphorical meaning is a pragmatic inference. However, I position myself beside Moura (2007: 417), for whom linguistic patterns govern the interpretation, observing the conventions of connotation and denotation. For Black (1993), the metaphorical statement is to tell and show. Speakers seek for resources and rules in their own language that allow the creation of metaphors for the interactionist theory.

Black apud Moura (2007:426) argues that metaphor is linked to connotation conventions. Complementing the interactionist theory is the theory of dual reference Glucksberg (2001, p. 53) also apud Moura (2007:426) for whom the interpretation of metaphor involves search, by listeners, of relevant dimensions of attribution.

The main question of this research is: How relevant dimensions of attribution can be connected to the framework of Pinker (2008)? Even if the listener does not have access, pragmatically, to the interpretation of metaphor because he does not share the same epistemic state of the speaker, the metaphor, according to the theory of dual reference, using common procedures to use literal language to the interpretation by the speaker?

As the denotation convention is also connected to the connotation convention, argues that metaphors exploit structural similarities between the concepts of lexical items that occur in topic position and vehicle.

Again, seeing the framework (Pinker) and the choice of the speaker are essential for the listener to pay attention to the positions of topic and vehicle, and through linguistic clues, reaching the interpretation of metaphor.

In his latest book: The stuff of thought (2008), Pinker develops the theory that our mind is able to focus on some aspects of reality in a special way. He calls this capacity to focus of mental zoom and to expose it in an appealing way, he provides some parallels between our representation of time and space. He affirms that the same reasoning that we attach to time we also attribute to space.

One parallel is that of individuals and groups: as if our minds were able to focus (zooming through mental) or individuals, separately, or the sets. Ex: Gravel and Pebble. This is an important feature of what Pinker calls the environment "depends on what we choose to focus and what we choose to ignore. The language of thought allows us to frame a situation in different and incompatible ways "(2008: 17).

For Pinker, our *words and constructions* reveal conceptions of physical reality and human social life that are similar in all cultures, but different products of our science and our intellectuals (2008: 39). My italics to point out these "constructions or expressions" to which he refers and compare them with the metaphorical constructions that we produce and reveal, in a sense, our framework.

In that book, Pinker points out the mind's ability to move from one framework to another. He presents some examples of gestalt to show the importance of the framework to understand the constructions. For him, interpreting and reinterpreting are basic powers of cognition. It is from this perspective that we propose to unpack the metaphors and their proposals and seek possibilities for framing. The analysis of propositions and a "say" of thought is also pointed out by Chierchia (2003) in his analysis of paraphrases, which he calls the analysis nexus. H e says it is rare for us to remember literally what we were told. Generally, we remember what we were told and reproduced through paraphrases (p. 61).

By proposing the unpacking and sorting of paraphrases that follows, we recall our ability indicated by Chierchia of making judgments of well-trained on sentences of our language and making judgments about how two sentences are related semantically. We can tell if they are good paraphrases of one another if they serve to characterize a given situation, and if they are incompatible etc. (P. 172).

Pinker also develops a concept of granulation of the world view of the mind (p. 89), stating that it is adjustable, "the speaker has an expectation that his listeners have the same grain that he has in mind, and when they do not have that, the result may be a failure in communication (p. 90).

My original question was: would these conceptual connections be a typical element of metaphor and they can not be paraphrased (Moura), because (cf. Pinker, 2008, p.17) we frame a situation differently and mutually incompatible?

A possible and preliminary answer: even if the speaker fits a given situation and produces a metaphorical exclusionary statement (Pinker, 2008), linguistic clues (Moura, 2007) allow an interpretation by the listener. Moura resumes in Metaphors and Proposition (Bolsa PQ. 2010-2013), for whom there is the possibility of paraphrase and adds: the interpretation of the listener is already somewhat a paraphrase.

It is remained for us to see whether the interpretation occurred because there appeared a legitimate paraphrase or at least closer to what had been framed by the speaker. Moura proposes that the issue of paraphrase is a matter of degree and suggests an unpacking. This work suggests that there may be more of a paraphrase (or framing by the listener), but they present themselves and are classified, possibly, after unpacking:

i. Most recurrent paraphrase;
ii. Less recurrent paraphrase;
iii. Unusual paraphrase;
iv. Paraphrase conflicting with the frame of the speaker

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
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These are the objectives and hypotheses, the assumption of the research:
To investigate if it is possible for the listener to "have" the same excluding frame of the speaker to interpret the metaphor and if it is also possible to list paraphrases for this metaphor, noting when the linguistic cues played a critical role;

Defend the hypothesis that even if the speaker fits a given situation and produces a metaphorical exclusionary statement, language cues allow an interpretation by the listener.

Analyzes:
The ongoing research is following these methodological steps:
1. Instances of metaphors found[2]:

For this article we investigated the use of transitive verbs in the position of vehicles of metaphors about emotions, producing sentences like these:

 (a) "*We have the science. We just **need the will**.*"

(Marie Claire, September 2010, V.17. Issue 9, p. 168)

(b) "If you ***get rid of the tension*** you feel by confinding in your friends (...)"

(Cosmopolitan, Septeber 2010, Vol. 249, No. 3, p. 154)

(c) "Anyone can ***have a slip in judgment.***"

(Cosmopolitan, September 2010, Vol. 249, No. 3, p. 192)

(d) "She had to ***shed that thought*** and focus on new goals."

(Cosmopolitan, Septeber 2010, Vol. 249, No. 3, p. 195)

2. Analyzes of the two elements present in these metaphorical statements (BLACK, 1993);

2 Elements[3]
Metaphorical utterance → (i) SAY (propositional content of the metaphor - cognitive function)
                                → (ii) SHOW (conceptual handling that a metaphor holds, the metaphor shows us one thing as another)

 (a) "*We have the science. We just **need the will**.*"

 (i) We know how to do it but we don't want to do it.

 (ii) There's no desire or intension to do it.

 (b) "If you ***get rid of the tension*** you feel by confinding in your friends (...)"

 (i) If you calm dowm by talking to your friends (…).

 (ii) If you throw out what you feel by talking to your friends (…).

 (c) "Anyone can ***have a slip in judgment.***"

(i) People make mistakes.

(ii) Make mistake is falling down.

(d) "She had to **shed that thought** and focus on new goals."

(i) She had to clear her mind and focus on new goals.

(ii) She had to lose/take off her old thoughts and focus on new goals.

3. Setting of the frame of the speaker (Pinker, 2008):

The frame of the speaker is somewhat connected to the context, in each example, the context is clarified below:

(a) "*We have the science. We just* **need the will**."

The Police Department saying that they could identify the abusers by testing the rape DNA evidence kit, but there is a long line of kits still to be tested and a few professionals to do that.

(b) "If you **get rid of the tension** you feel by confinding in your friends (...)"

A victim of sexual abuse telling how much better she felt by talking to her friends.

(c) "Anyone can **have a slip in judgment."**

A person who was convicted of driving drunk.

(d) "She had to **shed that thought** and focus on new goals."

A victim of sexual abuse telling how she recovered from the bad experience of having been raped.

4. Separation of lexical items that occur in topic position and vehicle position;

(a) "*We have the science. We just* **need the will**."

Vehicle position: Transitive verb: NEED

Topic: Emotion noun: WILL

(b) "If you **get rid of the tension** you feel by confinding in your friends (...)"

Vehicle position: Transitive verb expression: GET RID

Topic: Emotion noun: TENSION

(c) "Anyone can **have a slip in judgment."**

Vehicle position: Transitive verb expression: CAN HAVE A SLIP IN

Topic: Noun: JUDGEMENT

(d) "She had to **shed that thought** and focus on new goals."

Vehicle position: Transitive verb: SHED

Topic: Noun: THOUGHT

5. The possible paraphrases (framings) of the listener and their classification as:
i. Most recurrent paraphrase;
ii. Less recurrent paraphrase;
iii. Unusual paraphrase;
iv. Paraphrase conflicting with the frame of the speaker

(a) "*We have the science. We just **need the will***."

(i) We know how to do it but we don't want to do it.

(ii) We don't want to do it even though we know how to do it.

(iii) We have the method to do it we just need a good enough reason.

(iv) There is a cost to do it.

(b) "If you ***get rid of the tension*** you feel by confinding in your friends (...)."

(i) If you calm dowm by talking to your friends (…).

(ii) If you throw out what you feel by talking to your friends (…).

(iii) If you settle down and talk about it (…).

(iv) Easy does it (…).

(c) "Anyone can ***have a slip in judgment.***"

(i) Anyone can make mistakes.

(ii) He's not the only one to make mistakes.

(iii) It happens to anyone.

(iv) There's nothing else you can do about it, move on.

(d) "She had to ***shed that thought*** and focus on new goals."

(i) She had to clear her mind and focus on new goals.

(ii) She had to lose her old thoughts and focus on new goals.

(iii) She realized that was not a good idea and planned new things.

(iv) She had to forget what happened and go on.

Preliminary Conclusion

These preliminary analyzes showed that our assumptions may be right according to Moura (Bolsa PQ. 2010-2013) when he stated that there is a possibility of paraphrase because the interpretation of the listener is already somewhat a paraphrase. Also, it supports Moura (2007, p. 418) for whom the interpretation of a metaphor is guided by the context, which sets a standard of interpretation and, as proposed above, even if even if the speaker fits a given situation and produces a metaphorical exclusionary statement (Pinker, 2008), linguistic clues (Moura, 2007) allow an interpretation by the listener.

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[1] Doutoranda em Linguística pelo Programa de Pós-Graduação em Linguística da UFSC, sob orientação do Professor Doutor Heronides Maurílio de Melo Moura.
viviane.vilar@uol.com.br

[2] The examples are in English and were taken from magazines published in USA, though the previous project mentioned the research would be done with examples in Portuguese using magazines published in Brazil. There was no specific reason for that; it was just about research resources available. This choice does not affect the content of the linguistic expressions that are being investigated.

[3] For examples of paraphrases, English Language native were asked.